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Skill learning and conceptual thought: making a way through the wilderness 
 
Often, when philosophers want to emphasize the discontinuity between human and 
animal cognition, they point to the fact that normal, mature, human adults have the 
capacity to think abstractly, conceptually, flexibly and in ways that are not bound to their 
immediate surroundings.1  Notably, humans can contemplate the nature of justice, write a 
poem about a fictional character, plan a dinner party, and construct a 5-year plan.  In a 
similar spirit, when trying to locate the continuity between the intelligence of human and 
non-human animals, natural-minded philosophers often avoid talking about abstract, 
conceptual thought, but rather, emphasize action, ability, and skill.  It is supposed that it 
is in the practical realm that human animals and creatures lower on the evolutionary 
ladder might hold something in common. After all, birds build houses and humans build 
                                                
1 For example, philosophers as diverse as Fodor (1983) and Millikan (2006) have emphasized the 
flexibility, agency, and non-situation-bound character of human thought. Fodor writes: “We have only the 
narrowest of options about how the objects of perception shall be represented, but we have all the leeway in 
the world as to how we shall represent the objects of thought; outside perception the way that one deploys 
one’s cognitive resources, is, in general, rationally subservient to one’s utilities.  Here are some exercises 
that you can do if you choose: think of Hamlet as a revenge play; as a typical; product of Mannerist 
sensibility; as a pot-boiler ; as an unlikely vehicle for Great Garbo.  Think of sixteen different ways of 
using a brick.” (p. 55).  Millikan writes, “ The pushmi-pullyu animal solves only problems posed by 
immediate perception.  It does so by deciding from among possibilities currently presented in perception, or 
as known extensions from current perception, as in knowingly moving from a known place toward another 
place known to afford what the animal currently needs.  Human beings, on the other hand, spend a great 
deal of time collecting both skill and pure facts that no experience, either individual or the species, has yet 
shown any relevance to practical activity…They are curious about what will cause what and why, wholly 
apart form any envisioned practical applications for this knowledge” (p. 122).  
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houses. Squirrels can climb trees and humans can climb trees.  It is thought that if there is 
any place where we might be able to locate the natural springs of human intelligence, it 
will be in the area of intentional action and ability.2   
Contrary to received wisdom, in order to construct an adequate, naturalized theory 
of higher-order cognition, I suggest that we should look both to the continuity and 
discontinuity between human and non-human animal intelligence in action. That is, I 
claim that the discontinuity between human and non-human animal cognition is not 
simply realized in the distinction between action and conceptual thought, but rather, that 
there is important discontinuity between human and animal cognition in the realm of 
practical ability.  Crucially, I claim that discontinuity in the realm of action can be 
explanatorily powerful in providing us with a naturalized account of human cognition. In 
what follows, I demonstrate how exploring uniquely human skills provide us with the 
opportunity to construct an intermediate stage of intelligence, which is both naturally 
grounded and sufficiently sophisticated to explain some basic features of conceptual 
thought.  
My main claim is that the flexibility, creativity, agency, and deliberateness 
involved in skill refinement plays a key role in the development of human-style 
intelligence.  Specifically, I claim that human skill learning occupies an intermediate 
territory between rote, fixed, procedural behaviors and fully abstract, conceptual thought. 
I suggest that it is through the process of skill learning that intentional actions break free 
from their domain-specific, instantiation environments and begin to exhibit increasing 
degrees of distinctness and abstractness.  As such, it is through skill learning that action 
                                                
2 See Millikan (2006); Dretske(1997; 2006); Hurley(2006) for examples of this kind of move. 
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elements acquire the capacity to show up, not fully independent of any context 
whatsoever, but in multiple contexts and multiple roles.  
The following is a preliminary exploration of the relationship between skill 
learning and conceptual thought.  It is a first attempt to present a theory that does justice 
to the role of skill learning in developing fully rational, higher-order, cognitive faculties.  
As such, naturally, many of the details will be impressionistic.  Still, I hope that the 
general outlines and motivations of the theory will be clear enough to convince the reader 
that this approach is both promising and sound. 
This paper will proceed as follows: in section one, I present three important 
features of human skill.  In section two, I forward two distinctions: one between ability 
and skill and another between skill and conceptual thought.  In section three, I present a 
framework where skill learning constitutes an intermediate cognitive category, which 
affords the development of several features characteristic of human thought.  In section 
four, I review the hard-earned cognitive gains that follow from skill learning and, in 
section five, I respond to two objections. 
1. The curious nature of human skills  
1.1. Impractical skills—and so many of them 
 
 
One of the striking trends in human evolution, going back thousands of years, 
is the gradual diminution in the proportion of human effort devoted in any 
clearly discernable way to the achievements of the fundamental goals we 
share with animals: avoiding pain, hunger and predation, and seeking 
comfort, securing and mating opportunities.  Even if the peculiar human 
desiderata of prestige, power, wealth, beautiful surroundings, recreation, 
music, toys, and so forth have discernable instrumental rational (improving 
one’s contest for mates, enlarging one’s harem, one’s territory, one’s margin 
or error) they have more or less detached themselves from these inaugural 
foundations and become ends in themselves. The young man bought the 
guitar in order to attract young women, but now he has become a guitarist 
who would rather make music than love (Dennett, 2006). 
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A strange and often overlooked fact about humans is that we spend vast amounts of time, 
energy, and resources pursuing a multitude of hobbies and skills that have no clear 
evolutionary advantage.  As Millikan (2006) points out, “children practice hula hoops, 
Rubik’s cubes, wiggling their ears, cracking their knuckles, standing on their hands, and 
turning around to make themselves dizzy.” People not only learn to solve Rubik’s Cube 
puzzles, but some even learn how to solve them using their feet. They play Tetris for 
hours on end, build enormous card houses that no one will ever see, knit booties for their 
pets, assemble and disassemble model cars, and reenact their favorite movie scenes in 
front of the mirror.  
 Some activities involve developing athletic skill, others nurturing artistic talent. 
Some appear to be ways of fighting boredom, and others more like compulsions.  Some 
skills are performed in groups, some individually, some involve competitions or public 
displays while others never see the light of day.  Some skills highlight strength and 
beauty, others point to oddness or idiosyncrasy. Some skills are big and bold, others 
small and quiet.  Some skills are shared by most conspecifics and learned through formal 
education, others signal membership to a particular class or group, and still others never 
catch on beyond one lone individual.  The skills we develop are manifold, multiple, and 
amazing.  They are extraordinary and extraordinarily weird!  Why in the world do we 
pursue so many practically useless skills?   
1.2. Impractical skills—over and over again  
The oddness of human skill extends beyond the shear number of seemingly useless skills 
that we acquire to the amount of time and energy that we spend perfecting them.  It 
should be clear that the energy that we expend refining skills is notably disproportionate 
 5 
to any evolutionary advantage that they might hold.  Think of the hours, days, months, 
and years that people spend practicing, training, drilling, and perfecting a sport, a musical 
instrument, a craft, or a hobby.  We are not surprised when we hear about a person 
continuing to practice some skill after she is able to successfully perform it.3  In fact, we 
are often inspired by the amount of dedication and discipline that it takes to push one’s 
expertise to the next level. People refine and refine and train and train and, at their best, 
their goal is not to reach the bar, but to set a new one.4  
Further, we should notice that developing skill often involves not only achieving a 
goal but achieving that goal in a particular manner or style.  The fact is that attaining 
many high-level goals requires attention to and control over the way or fashion in which 
the skill, which aims at that goal, is instantiated.  Even more surprisingly, however, we 
sometimes see that goal of the skill is irrelevant for some particular practice.  Instead, it is 
the particular style or way in which one instantiates a skill that one seeks to refine—
regardless of whether that refinement will make the goal more accessible. Think of the 
symphony, ballroom dancing, the Olympics, or the Venice Biennale—the goal isn’t just 
to play a note, or dance a waltz, or finish a race, or paint a portrait, but to perform 
elegantly, precisely, powerfully, and harmoniously.  This emphasis may have an integral 
connection to bettering performance, but it need not.  Crucially, in either case, we must 
notice that in order to refine a skill, some feature of the skill itself, and not just some 
feature of the end at which the skill is aimed, must become an object of interest and 
                                                
3 As Dennett writes “surprise is a wonderful dependent variable, and should be used more often in 
experiments; it is easy to measure and is a telling betrayal of the subject’s having expected something else” 
(2001, p. 982). 
4 This does not, of course, require that all or even most of our skills are developed in this way. Such a claim 
would be blatantly false.  The important point is not that all skills are developed to this extent, but that each 
individual has some skills, which she has developed beyond their mere utility.  
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concern. This means that we take interest in developing skills as ends in themselves.  And 
this is too is weird! 
1.3 Impractical is as impractical does: imitation 
We should note that the impractical orientation that we have towards skills and the means 
by which they are performed can be identified in other uniquely human practices. For 
instance, our impractical orientation towards actions and their means can be gleaned from 
the strange human tendency towards imitation.    
It is widely accepted that human children imitate far more frequently and in a far 
more detailed manner than any other organism.5  For present purposes, it is important to 
notice that not only do human children prefer imitation as a learning strategy but often, 
human children will replicate an action or activity that is largely irrelevant for the goal at 
hand.6  Curiously, this is kind of behavior is not seen in non-human primates.  
For example, Horner and Whiten (2005) found that when both chimpanzees and 
children observed a causally irrelevant action in a series of movements that was required 
for retrieving a reward from a locked box, only human children replicated the causally 
useless movement.  Once chimpanzees identified the movement as inessential to their 
goal, they dropped that movement from their behavioral repertoire.  In contrast, children, 
even after identifying the movement as causally inefficacious,7 continued to incorporate 
the movement into the sequence of behaviors they used to unlock the box. This indicates 
that while for primates the means by which goals are achieved derive their value 
                                                
5 This does not mean that everyone agrees that only humans imitate. For instance, Byrne and Russon 
(1998); Byrne (2002); and Horner & Whiten  (2005) disagree with Call, Carpenter & Tomasello (2005) by 
holding that non-human primates are capable of imitation. Regardless of this dispute, however, everyone 
agrees that imitation plays a special role in the learning and development of human children. 
6 See also Geregely & Csibra (2005); Schwier, et al. (2006); Byrne and Russon (1998), and Hobson and 
Lee (1999).   
7 Horner and Whiten (2005) conducted separate experiments establishing that children were able to 
discriminate between causally effective and ineffective actions. 
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exclusively from their instrumentality, for children, the means of goal attainment can 
have value that is detached from their role as a means for reaching some end. That is, for 
children, replicating a purposeful sequence of movements can hold value apart from that 
sequence’s connection or efficacy for achieving some end. For children, the value of the 
activity need not be a practical, instrumental value.   
The impractical orientation that children have towards the means by which goal-
directed actions are instantiated is by no means isolated to a few clinical instances.  In 
fact, the reproduction of the detailed style of an observed action is almost always 
irrelevant for accomplishing a particular task.  But children regularly take interest in 
perfecting the detailed manner or style in which a model demonstrates a behavior.  It’s 
possible, then, that this “means-centric orientation” present in imitation may be the same 
orientation that drives children to refine and perfect their skills once they have acquired 
them.  That is, the emphasis on and preoccupation with impractical actions may 
underwrite a number of human activities that are relevant for developing our peculiar 
kind of intellect.  
1.4 Impractical skills and evolutionary considerations 
Are skills and their refinements really evolutionarily valueless?  Couldn’t we find some 
story to tell where hula hooping, origami folding, terrarium building, video-game 
playing, memorizing baseball statistics, and popping one’s thumb in and out of its socket 
all do something for us evolutionarily?  Perhaps they make us more attractive to potential 
mates by highlighting our beauty, coordination, attention to detail, or sense of humor.  
Like peacock feathers or the nests of Bower birds, perhaps skills just make us stand out.8   
The problem with this kind of explanation, however, is that for every skill that we can 
                                                
8 Thanks to Josep Call for pointing out this potential explanation of the utility of our skills. 
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think of that may show off some evolutionarily relevant feature, there are ten other skills 
that do not. The fact is that for every respectable, generalizable, evolutionary principle, 
which could explain the bizarreness of some one skill or other, there are countless other 
skills that do not naturally fit the bill.   
Of course, such an explanation would also ignore the lack of proportionality 
between the time and energy invested in refining skills and their not-very-straightforward 
payoffs.  This is not to say that skills never have or have had any evolutionary role,9 but it 
is to say that whatever they do for us now, as Dennett (2006) put it, “they have more or 
less detached themselves from these inaugural foundations and become ends in 
themselves.”  
Additionally, it is important for us to note that just coming up with some 
evolutionary story for each odd or weird human endeavor is not enough for a selection 
story.  For a non-contentious naturalist account, we would also have to show how 
pursuing that particular activity would be more effective than spending one’s time 
pursuing some other more straightforward activity.   That is, the bizarre activity couldn’t 
just be attractive to someone in some way, but it would have to be shown to be more 
effective, in an evolutionarily significant way, than the countless other activities that one 
could alternatively pursue in order to reach that same end.  The activity’s ancestor, after 
all, would have had to have beaten out countless other endeavors in being selected for. 
So, one may claim that playing hours of Tetris on one’s smartphone signals to a potential 
mate one’s excellent hand-to-eye coordination, but then we’d have to ask if perhaps 
playing actual tennis with this potential mate wouldn’t signal this more effectively.  
                                                
9 Thanks to Richard Moore for highlighting this important point. 
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At this stage, I recommend revisiting our unreflective assumption that every 
activity must have a proprietary purpose for its existence. We should notice that a 
naturalistic story does not require that each activity on its own conform to the 
requirement of having practical advantage.  It is consistent with evolutionary theory that 
selection may be for an entire class of abilities taken together.  It follows that instead of 
thinking of the evolutionary payoff of, e.g., learning the River Dance, and then for 
clicking one’s tongue, and then again for embroidering doll’s clothes, we ought to look at 
this group of activities as a whole, as a group of individually, more or less valueless 
activities.  When we take the category of “practically valueless skills,” it becomes 
possible to consider the evolutionary payoff at a more abstract level of individuation. 
In short, only after we accept the fact that we pursue impractical skills will we be 
in a position to ask, “For what reason might we pursue evolutionarily impractical skills 
when there seems to be no such parallel in the animal world?”  That is, only if we accept 
that there are valueless activities can we then ask about the value of these valueless 
things. In the remainder of this paper, I will argue that though, individually, most human 
skills have no evolutionary advantage, taken together, the class of individually, valueless 
activities plays a crucial role in setting the stage for intellectual growth at the 
intermediate level of cognitive development.   
2. Two distinctions: ability and skill & skill and concepts 
For the sake of terminological clarity, in the remainder of this paper, I will refer to 
abilities as the general class of capacities that reliably achieve practical success.  In 
contrast, I will refer to skills as the sub-class of abilities, which are characterized by the 
fact that they are refined or developed as a result of effortful attention and control to the 
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skill itself.  As such, only if a subject develops an ability with explicit attention to that 
ability itself and not merely to the goal at which that ability is aimed, will I call it a skill.  
I will also insist that there is an important feature of full-fledged conceptual 
thought that skills are incapable of expressing.  Specifically, I claim that skills are 
incapable of meeting the context-independence criterion (CIC). We can think of CIC in 
contrast to another important characteristic of conceptual thought: namely, the generality 
constraint.  To understand these two features of conceptual thought, I suggest we turn to 
Gareth Evans (1982).   
As Evans writes: 
It is a feature of the thought-content that John is happy that to grasp it requires 
distinguishable skills. In particular, it requires possession of the concept 
happiness—knowledge of what it is for a person to be happy; and that is something 
not tied to this or that particular person‘s happiness. There simply could not be a 
person who could entertain the thought that John is happy and the thought Harry is 
friendly, but who could not entertain—who was conceptually debarred from 
entertaining—the thought that John is friendly or Harry is happy (p.102-3). 
 
For Evans, being a concept requires meeting two independent criteria.  It requires that if 
one possesses a concept, one must have the capacity to both apply that concept in various 
situations (the generality constraint), and also, to entertain that concept without applying 
it in any situation in particular (CIC).  That is, one must be able to think of that concept 
“as such. ” Accordingly, to meet the generality constraint (GC), a subject S who 
possesses the concept c, must be able to think of c in context a, and also in context b.  To 
meet the context-independence criterion (CIC), a subject S who possesses concept c, must 
be able to think of c independent of all contexts; S must be able to think of c “as such”.10   
                                                
10 Fodor LOT2, 138) writes that “[A] sufficient condition for having the concept C is: being able to think 
about something as a C (being able to bring the property C before the mind as such, as I‘ll sometimes put 
it.”  Notably, McDowell (1994) has argued that concepts can be non-general or, as he calls them, 
demonstrative. What’s important is that generality and context-independence are distinct properties and we 
should be able to distinguish when these two independent constraints are met. The importance is not in the 
name, but in the distinction.  I’m pretty sure all would agree that the CIC is often, but not always, satisfied 
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 It is the inability of skill to meet CIC that prevents us from identifying skills with 
full-fledged, higher-order concepts.11  The reason that skills cannot meet CIC is fairly 
simple: context-independence requires abstraction from the particular instantiation 
situation but such abstraction is devastating to the successful performance of a skill.  
After all, in order for a skill to be successfully instantiated one must adjust, shift and 
respond to the very particular features of the environment in which the skill is being 
performed. Lacking sensitivity to the particular conditions in which a skill is instantiated 
sabotages the possibility of that skill’s success.  
For example, if one rides a bike without being responsive to the very material, the 
very incline, and the very uniformity of the surface on which one is riding (e.g., a flat 
paved road, a grassy uphill, or a rocky mountain descent) one will not be able to perform 
the micromillimeter, microsecond bodily adjustments required for staying on one’s bike.  
The crucial point is this: while full-fledged concepts can be abstracted away from their 
environments, skills develop by becoming more and more attuned to their particular 
circumstances. While concepts move towards context-independent, the elements, which 
constitute skill, as they become more and more refined, become more and more sensitive 
to context.  
3. A proposal: skill refinement as an intermediate developmental stage 
Distinguishing between abilities, skills, and concepts opens up a way to ground higher 
order cognition in more basic, but still intelligent, bodily action. Specifically, in what 
follows, I argue that it is through skill learning that actions, properties, and mental states 
                                                                                                                                            
in mature, human thought and that generality is a more minimal requirement.  Everyone should agree that 
meeting one constraint but not both is different from meeting both.   
11 This is relevant to the knowledge-how/knowledge-that debate (stemming back to Ryle (1949) and 
recently made popular by Stanley and Williamson (2001) and Stanley (2011a; 2011b). See Fridland 
(forthcoming) for more about how the problem of particularity presents a challenge for Intellectualism. 
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first acquire the ability to break free from their particular, immediate, instantiation 
environments in order to show up in different environments and situations.  In what 
follows, I shall propose that skill learning can provide us with an account of the 
flexibility, manipulability, and agency required for satisfying something like the 
generality constraint in action. 
 Importantly, on my account, the generality constraint (GC) and the context-
independence criterion (CIC) are neither identical nor developed simultaneously.  This 
means that a further developmental stage is required in order for human reasoning to 
become fully abstract.  Still, before one can run, one must walk.  As such, I think that 
achieving the more basic kind of flexibility needed for recombination into multiple action 
contexts is a huge step in cognitive development. In what follows, I will show why skills 
are a prime candidate for driving the flexibility and agency of recombination.  As such, I 
will propose a naturalized explanation of this essential feature of human cognition.   
3.1. General relations 
  To begin, we should notice that we have roughly four options for laying out the 
logical relationship between skill learning and conceptual thought.  Either (a) skill 
learning is a prerequisite for conceptual thought, (b) skill learning and conceptual thought 
are both the results of same-level cognitive mechanisms, (c) skill learning is the result of 
conceptual thought, or (d) they bear no relation to one another.12  I will present several 
reasons suggesting that (a) is the most convincing of these four options.  To clarify, I will 
not claim that (a) must be true for purely logical or conceptual reasons.  Rather, I propose 
that this particular way of framing the relationship between skill learning and conceptual 
                                                
12 Not having a relation is, of course, not a relation, but it is a conceptual possibility. After all, it might be 
that skill learning and conceptual thought simply have no interesting connection to one another. 
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thought allows us to account for human cognition in the natural world while 
simultaneously doing justice to a whole host of empirical research. This means that the 
truth of (a) is not conceptual or a priori but rather the result of abduction.  
3.2.  Representational Redescription   
In order to advance the case that skill learning functions as a prerequisite for conceptual 
thought, I will rely on Annette Karmiloff-Smith’s (1992) model of Representational 
Redescription (RR, from hereon).  Though I will not commit myself to every letter of this 
doctrine, I will use the general framework of RR as a tool for elucidating the relationship, 
which I submit attains between skill learning and conceptual thought.  Essentially, I will 
forward the claim that the intermediate stage of the RR model is best understood as a 
stage of skill learning where a child shifts her concern from success at a given task 
towards attempts to refine the style or manner in which that task is instantiated.  In 
contrast to Karmiloff-Smith’s own model, I claim that this intermediate stage of RR in 
not characterized by an interest in internal representations, but rather, by a focus on 
action manipulation.   
The RR model individuates human intellectual development into three basic 
stages.  Roughly, according to RR, a mental state at the first stage of human cognitive 
development is best understood as “implicit, not representational, procedural and must be 
run in its totality.  It cannot be accessed or operated on” (Karmiloff-Smith (1986), p. 
102). This first level of procedural knowledge is fully embedded in a context and tied to 
particular situations and circumstances.  Such cognitive states have practical value but 
lack flexibility. They are not composed of atomic or compositional parts, but rather, of 
whole sequences which are difficult to interrupt and individuate.   
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Importantly, “behavioral mastery is a prerequisite for subsequent representational 
change” (Karmiloff-Smith (1990), p. 60) into the second level of redescription.  This 
means that redescription’s purpose in not simply geared towards practical success, since 
practical success is a prerequisite for redescription. 
 At the second stage of cognitive development, the implicit procedures from the 
first level of representation are redescribed into the same representational code “i.e., 
kinaesthetic, spatial, linguistic, etc.” (Karmiloff-Smith(1986), p.102) and begin to exhibit 
a limited kind of flexibility. Karmiloff-Smith (1992) breaks this intermediate stage into 
two levels where first Ei representations are worked over by metaprocedures that remain 
unconcious, and then, those procedures are again redescribed into the same 
representational code in Eii.  Importantly, at the Eii stage, a child has conscious access to 
these procedures and, as such, begins to “gain some control over the organization of her 
internal representations” (Karmiloff-Smith (1990).  The middle or intermediate stage of 
cognitive development allows for limited flexibility and variability.  At this stage, 
procedures are broken up into parts and begin to acquire a degree of manipulability and 
control.  At the second level of redescription procedures become a “problem-space” for 
children.  As such, these procedures can be acted on, and attended to.  
Importantly, in contrast to the standard RR model, I claim that the procedures at 
the intermediate stage of redescription should not be thought of as primarily internal 
represenations, but rather, as actions that children regularly instantiate and thereby 
develop into skills.  That is, the problem space for children at the intermediate level of 
RR is not one of internal representations, but rather, of intentional action. The child is not 
primarily focused on the way the procedures underlying a task are internally represented, 
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but rather, on refining the manner in which she is able to execute her actions.13 I will 
provide arguments for this proposed change below. 
 To return to the RR model, we should notice that after recurrent cycles at the 
intermediate level of redescription, representations are again translated or redescribed. 
This time, however, they are translated into a different representational code than that 
which was used at the two previous stages.  This code is abstract and allows for the 
generality, flexibility, and objectivity of fully mature, conceptual thought.  This last level 
of RR grounds higher order reflection, abstract thought, and theoretical reasoning.  Also, 
the third stage of RR it is notable for allowing connections between various unrelated 
spheres of action and thought to be established.  In this way, expertise or knowledge from 
distinct domains may be transferred to others.  As Clark and Karmiloff-Smith (1993) 
write, “RR frees knowledge from spatial, temporal and causal constraints and enables 
new links to be noticed across originally different representational formats” (p. 575).  We 
should also note that at each stage of redescription, there is a trade-off between the 
fineness of grain of the information contained in the representation and conscious 
accessibility to that representation.  
For the purposes of my argument, it is not vital that I take a stance on the exact 
nature of the underlying code at the third level of redescription.  Lawrence Barsalou 
(2003; 2008) claims that modal, grounded concepts can instantiate symbolic 
representations while Sun et al. (2001) have claimed that redescription into a wholly 
different type of code elegantly accounts for the difference between the accessibility of 
concepts to conscious thought and the inaccessibility of procedures at lower levels.  I 
                                                
13 Though I will focus on embodied activities such as dance or sport, I also consider social skills to be 
developed much in the same way.  I will not give an account of social cognition here, but I do think that it 
can be integrated into an amended model of RR rather easily. 
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would like to stay neutral on the exact nature of the code of conceptual thought, while 
remaining fully committed to the idea that at this third level of rational development, 
concepts become fully abstract and context-independent.  For the remainder of this paper, 
I will not say much about either the first or third level of RR.  Before moving on, 
however, I’d like to point out one further feature of the RR framework: moves from one 
stage of description to another are not discrete changes that occur at one particular 
moment or age, but rather, are the result of recurrent cycles.  As such, moving from the 
first to the second stage and then to the third requires regular and recurrent application.  
3.3. Evidence in favor of a tripartite model of cognitive development 
As Karmiloff-Smith (1986) has argued, the standard dichotomies between conceptual and 
procedural knowledge (conscious/unconscious; implicit/explicit; first-order/second-order) 
are insufficient to capture the intermediate levels of flexibility and variation present in 
human cognitive development. In short, there are systematic differences between various 
stages of cognitive development that are largely overlooked when one conceives of 
cognition as bivalent.  Many features of cognition, such as flexibility, generality, 
transferability, and consciousness, are not all or nothing. 14 
Here, I will limit myself to reviewing one particular study in order to demonstrate 
this point.  When asked to draw “an impossible person,” 4-6-year-olds created drawings 
that differed significantly from 8-10-year-olds who were asked to complete the same 
task.  In particular, there were striking differences in the type and timing of changes and 
variations that each group was able to produce.  Importantly, younger children made 
deletions at the end of their drawings, which involved no interruption of the sequential 
order of their drawing procedure.  Younger children also produced changes in size and 
                                                
14 Philips et al. (1985); Hormelin et al.(1989); Shankweiler (forthcoming); Hurley (2001). 
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shape but did not introduce objects or features from different conceptual categories.  4-6-
year-olds showed some flexibility, but this flexibility was limited in both type and 
sequential order.  In contrast, 8-10-year-olds who were asked to complete the same task, 
changed orientation, added elements from various unrelated conceptual categories and 
made changes at several points in their drawing sequence indicating that their drawing 
pattern could be interrupted more freely than that of the 4-6-year-olds.  The older 
children also followed a sequence “but they do not have to rigidly stick to it” (Karmiloff-
Smith (1990) p. 57 & 72).  
These findings indicate that accounting for older children’s superior flexibility is 
not simply a matter of paying attention to the number of changes they make, but rather 
considering the kinds of changes that they are able to make.  In short, there are qualitative 
differences in the kinds of variations that each group of children is able to produce when 
given the same task. It is exactly this contrast, however, that cannot be captured by a 
cognitive model that only has the resources to classify knowledge dichotomously as 
procedural or conceptual, flexible or inflexible.  After all, if one only had the resources to 
label 4-6-year-old knowledge as implicit or explicit, as procedural or conceptual, then 4-
6-year-old capacities would have to be classified alongside those of 8-10-year-olds.  
However, the behavior of these two groups exhibited clear, systematic differences. As 
such, these differences must be captured by a cognitive model and this necessitates 
distinguishing an intermediate stage of cognitive development where variation and 
flexibility is present, but limited in type and kind from both procedural and conceptual 
stages of development.   
3.4 An amendment to RR: swapping skills for internal representations 
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As I stated above, I suggest that we move from an understanding of the intermediate level 
of RR as a stage that is primarily concerned with internal representations, towards an 
understanding of this stage as primarily concerned with the manipulation and control of 
external actions or abilities.  The intermediate stage of RR, I claim, is neither simply 
concerned with the ends of intentional actions, nor with the decontextualized internal 
representations of such actions. Instead, we ought to consider the intermediate stage as a 
place where attention is focused on actions themselves—it is a stage where a child begins 
attempting to exert control over the style, manner or way in which her abilities are 
instantiated.  
The fact is that all empirical evidence seems consistent with the view that 
children’s efforts at the intermediate stage of cognitive development are largely directed 
towards their own actions.  As such, it seems likely that internal representations find their 
way into the discussion of the intermediate stage of RR as a result of a conflation.  The 
conflation is between procedures as mental patterns that represent embodied actions and 
procedures as the patterns of instantiated action themselves.  
We ought to note that this conflation is similar in structure to a common mistake 
that occurs in the consciousness literature.  There, people often confuse the content of a 
conscious state with the content of an introspective state.15  As such, one will claim that 
the content of a conscious state of believing that there is a tree in the yard is “that I 
believe that there is a tree in the yard.” However, this is a mistake because this is the 
content of an introspective state about the belief and not the content of the conscious state 
about the tree.  The content of the conscious state is just “that there is a tree in the yard.”  
                                                
15 See Rosenthal (1991; 1994; 2004) for more on this kind of mistake. 
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Likewise, we must differentiate between a concern with the representation of an action 
and concern with the action itself.  
The fact is that a much more minimal and justifiable interpretation of the evidence 
is to understand children, at this intermediate stage of development, as developing the 
capacity to shift from an exclusive concern with the goals of their actions to a concern for 
the way in which those goals are attained—that is, to shift their concern from ends to 
means.  At the intermediate stage of cognitive development, children develop the 
capacity to attend to the way, manner, or style in which they reach their goals.  As such, 
children begin to take abilities, or the means of goal attainment, as objects of interest and 
concern in and of themselves.  On my amended model, at the Ei/Eii stage, children do not 
go from concern with the external world to concern with internal representations, but 
rather, shift concern from ends to means. 
I should add that this amendment is not simply advancing a semantic distinction.16   
That is, even if the skills that children are attending to are in fact internal representations, 
it is not the case that children attend to those skills as representations.  That is, from the 
point of view of the child, the child is attending to her own actions.  In Fregean (1980) 
terms, we are on the sense side of the sense/reference distinction. Therefore, the 
underlying, functional, representational nature of the skill is irrelevant for understanding 
what the child, from her perspective, attends to and manipulates at the intermediate stage 
of RR.  And it is exactly from the perspective of the child that we need to understand this 
developmental stage.  
3.5 How does it work? 
                                                
16 Thanks to Austen Clark for drawing my attention to this issue. 
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My claim is that when children develop the capacity to take means as ends in themselves, 
they also develop the resources to inject variation into the sequences or patterns of action, 
which were fixed at the first level of RR.  In this way, children begin to express limited 
degrees of creativity, flexibility, and organizational control over their own abilities.  At 
the intermediate level of RR, because a child becomes interested in improving the means 
by which she achieves her ends, she becomes able to break up, shuffle, and reorganize the 
fixed procedures that accounted for her success at the first stage of RR.  
As a result of a child’s attempts to refine her own abilities, the mutually 
reinforcing features of agency, flexibility, object/action individuation, and recombination 
enter onto the human cognitive scene.  As intentional actions themselves become the 
objects of concern, through recurrent and regular cycles of purposeful instantiation, 
action patterns begin to break free from their bounded sequences. Activities gain 
flexibility, become proto-compositional, recombinable and emerge in various contexts to 
fulfill multiple roles.   
Importantly, improvement efforts directed at abilities produce the individuation of 
action parts and this individuation provides the grounds for further flexibility, 
recombination, and control, which, in turn, leads to finer-grained individuation and 
increased opportunities for recombination, and so on.  Action elements, thus 
individuated, are then capable of occupying multiple roles in multiple situations. That is, 
individuation provides action-elements with criteria for identification and 
reidentification, and this then makes it possible for the same action element to be used in 
various circumstances. In this way, skill learning breaks up procedures and makes them 
both flexible and compositional.  The process of skill refinement also naturally leads to 
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the development of a sense of agency because it is through intentionally performing 
actions that flexibility, manipulability, and transferability develop. 
3.5.1 Trial, error, and flexibility 
At the intermediate level of RR, the child’s goal becomes to instantiate abilities in 
particular ways, manners, or styles.  At this stage of RR, a child begins to attend to her 
own actions as ends in themselves and not merely as instrumental for achieving the goal 
at which they are directed. This shift from attending to goals to attending to the means 
through which those goals are attained is a major achievement in cognitive development.  
At this stage, a child can apply effort to working on the way in which she achieves her 
desired ends.  In attempting to manipulate the manner or style of ability instantiations, 
these abilities become a “problem space” for the child.  The child becomes concerned 
with guiding and controlling her actions in order to figure out how to perform those 
abilities in particular ways.  In order to do this, she applies effort and attention.  
As the child becomes interested in performing an ability in a particular fashion, 
she must find a way to introduce variation into the sequence that she ordinarily follows.  
This should be obvious since there can be no change or improvement without the 
possibility of variation. So, the child must experiment with her actions in order to figure 
out how to change them, how to control them, and how to get them right.  This 
experimentation takes place through a kind of practical trial and error, which naturally 
introduces the first seeds of flexibility into a fixed action pattern or ability sequence. 
In learning to perform an ability in a particular manner, a child must make various 
attempts or trials. Some of these trials will work, but many will not.  As such, interfering 
with an action pattern produces flexibility, but it does so at a cost: failure.  As such, the 
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first signs of an action-patterns breaking apart at the intermediate stages of RR can be 
observed in the mistakes that children begin to make after they have attained practical 
mastery at the first level of RR.  Empirically, there is clear evidence that children begin to 
make mistakes after achieving mastery of a particular task.17 
 This kind of trade-off between success and flexibility is easy to understand.  To 
improve the way one performs some task requires shuffling, shifting, adjusting and 
altering the way in which that task is instantiated.  The once fixed but successful 
sequence is tweaked through trial and error and, as a result, the child makes various 
mistakes or errors when instantiating it.   
Counter-intuitively, then, before a child can gain full control over her actions, she 
must reject the automatic control which already guides her abilities. That is, the natural, 
thoughtless, procedural control that a child has over her abilities at the first stage of RR 
must be replaced by an agent-directed control that is more responsive and flexible to the 
specific goals of the child.  In this process, long-term expertise and improvement requires 
short-term sacrifice.  Trial and error thus produces flexibility at the cost of automatic 
success.  This flexibility is responsible for breaking up action sequences into constitutive 
elements, which then allows for finer-grained manipulability and control and, thus, 
provides the foundation for higher levels of expertise.   
3.5.2 Recombination and individuation 
As skill refinement progresses, two mutually reinforcing characteristics emerge.  These 
are the very characteristics, which underwrite the capacity for the improvement and 
                                                
17 Karmiloff-Smith (1986), p. 107. 
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refinement of a skill but they are also the features, which account for the satisfaction of 
the generality constraint.  They are individuation and recombination.   
 As the action sequence, which constitutes ability becomes the object of trial and 
error, the sequence that has up to now followed a fixed pattern, relaxes in various limited 
ways.  This relaxation allows for, at first, limited degrees of combination and 
recombination to emerge. What this means is that trial and error allows for variations in 
the pattern and execution of a sequence.  This limited recombination, in turn, allows for a 
coarse kind of individuation of the parts of a sequence. The recombined parts begin to 
develop boundaries of individuation and identification.  Such individuation, then allows 
for more effortful attention and control to be focused on the individuated parts and, in 
turn, further combination and recombination can develop.  And then further 
individuation, and so on. 
Through effortful trial and error, I suggest that activity sequences break up into 
action-parts.  As a child learns to manipulate and control various parts of an action 
sequence, she develops the capacity to attend to and control not simply the sequence in its 
entirety, but finer and finer-grained portions of the sequence. A child becomes able not 
only to consider a sequence as a whole, but begins to think of it as having a beginning, 
and an end, and then later as having a beginning and a middle and an end, and later, as a 
beginning part I, beginning part II and beginning part III, middle, and end, etc. 
Importantly, as these elements become individuated they also acquire the capacity 
to show up at different stages of a sequence or in different sequences altogether.  These 
elements develop boundaries of identification and those identifiable parts are then 
capable of entering into other sequences, situations, and scenarios.  They develop the 
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capacity to occupy not just one role, but many. They are able to show up not just in one 
environment or set of circumstances, but in several.  The same element acquires the 
capacity to play multiple roles.  The kick before a cartwheel can show up as the preface 
to a front walkover and the sequence of notes that ends a particular piece of music can be 
played in the middle of another.  
In short, action elements break free from one environment and show up in others.   
And this is exactly what is required for the satisfaction of the generality constraint: that 
some element can be identified and reidentified, applied and reapplied, used and reused 
in various, novel circumstances.  To possess the concept GREEN, I must be able to think 
of the couch as green and the chair as green. If I can think that John loves Mary, I must 
also be able to think that Mary loves John.  My claim is that in the realm of action, we 
can meet GC through skill refinement.  For example, a swing s can show up in context a 
and also in context b.  We can execute swing s followed by turn t, and we can also 
execute turn t followed by swing s. We can reverse the relations of s to t and t to s.  We 
can do all of this in action and, in fact, this is precisely what we need to learn in order to 
execute complex skills at any level of expertise.   
Without the capacity to manipulate (combine/recombine/adjust) the parts 
(individuated elements) of a skill, a skill simply could not improve.  This becomes a 
practical requirement for refining the way or the manner in which a skill is performed.18  
As such, the recombination and individuation that takes place in skill learning assures us 
of the satisfaction of GC. The more a skill is improved and refined, the more attention to 
                                                
18 Notice, that this is not a requirement of abilities since their sequences are not compositional.  However, 
in order to develop skills, which are under the control of an agent, it is precisely this kind of individuation 
and flexibility that is required since one must take the skill as an object of effort and attention. Unless the 
action parts are sufficiently fine-grained, they will not be susceptible to the kind of control that is required 
for high-level expertise. 
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finer-grained elements of the sequence is required, and the more these elements become 
refined, the more they are able to be abstracted, controlled, manipulated, and transferred 
into various circumstances.19  As such, skill learning both spawns and requires the 
flexibility, agency, control, individuation, and recombination, which is at the heart of GC.   
3.6 An example 
In choosing an example, I want to remain as gender-neutral and culturally universal as 
possible.  It is hard to do this, but here’s my best shot: it seems that no matter whether a 
child is a boy or girl, rich or poor, almost in all cultures and locations, it will learn to kick 
a ball.20  
As a preface to this example, I should make two points: (1) it would not be a 
counterexample to my theory if all children did not learn some one particular skill.  It 
would be a counterexample, if there were cultures where children did not develop and 
refine skills beyond the level required for practical survival.  As long as all children learn 
some skill or other, which is developed and refined beyond its usefulness for immediate 
success, that is, that is learned not only as a means to some other goal but as an end in 
itself, then my theory is in good shape. (2) It is also important to notice that I am not 
claiming that the content of conceptual thought is directly extracted through skill 
learning.  Rather, skill learning constitutes a necessary stage of cognitive development, 
which precedes the development of conceptual thought.  My claim is that the function of 
skill learning is to develop a conceptual capacity but it is not my claim that it is skill 
learning’s function to furnish that conceptual capacity with content.21   
                                                
19 See Phillips et al. (1985) for more on the nontransferability of skills at primitive levels of representation.  
20 Or, at the very least, a can. 
21 Some skill learning will undoubtedly be the content of conceptual thought.  My only point is that being 
involved in skill learning is not necessary for developing into a concept.   
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 Back to kicking a ball: first off, it is important to notice that at the intermediate 
stage of RR, the kind of ball kicking that we are considering is not oriented towards 
simple success (i.e., contact of foot with ball resulting in ball moving).  In fact, the 
intermediate level of cognitive development only proceeds after procedural success has 
been sustained at first level of representation.  As such, we must imagine a child who can 
successfully kick a ball, but who is attempting to kick the ball in a particular way. 
 So, let’s call our kicker, little Sally.  Sally can already kick a ball.  Let’s even 
posit that she has some minimal control over where the ball goes when she kicks it.  
Now, however, she wants the ball not just to go in a particular direction, but she wants to 
kick it forcefully, gracefully, like that player on TV, or like her older sister.22  In order to 
do this, she has to attend not only to the goal post, but also to the position of her leg.  She 
has to begin to differentiate between kicking forcefully, and kicking gently. She has to 
pay attention to how high she lifts her leg, how fast she can run, and how many steps she 
can take before kicking the ball. She has to attend to the amount of effort that kicking 
requires and the exact spot on the ball that she has to kick.  
Also, let’s imagine that Sally begins experimenting by kicking the ball with 
different parts of her foot.  She uses her toe, and then the inside of her foot, and then 
learns to switch back and forth between kicking with the inside of her right foot and next 
with the left, and then she learns to vary the number of steps in between the alternating 
kicks.  In learning to kick in different ways, she feels that kicking with the inside of her 
                                                
22 It’s essential to note that skill learning often proceeds by imitation. That is, we do not learn skills in 
isolation but often mimic what others do.  Further, others often exaggerate how they do something in order 
to demonstrate the way they do it so that someone can learn from them.  This kind of social skill learning is 
a special feature of human interaction and though I am not developing this aspect of human learning here, I 
do take it as an important feature of skill to be developed elsewhere.   
 27 
foot and kicking with her toe create different feelings of control, they create different 
results, and they require different degrees of effort.  
All of these variations: the run, the angle, height and bend of the leg, the inside of 
the left and the inside of the right foot, the toe, the number of steps in between the kicks, 
the feelings of tension and effort associated with them, the proprioceptive sensations, the 
visual and auditory sensations (look here, it sounds like this), all change and become 
relevant in developing kicking expertise; they all become intentional objects that Sally 
will try to guide and control.  After all, she has to learn how to attend to and control all of 
these elements, if there is any hope that she will learn to kick like an expert.  
In order to master the appropriate variations for kicking a ball, Sally must begin to 
treat her once entire kicking sequence as individuated kicking parts.  To achieve 
expertise, she must learn to take action parts as objects of attention and control.  Kicking 
with the inside of the foot becomes individuated from kicking with the toe, a kick to pass 
becomes different from a kick to score, running and kicking becomes different from 
running, stopping, and kicking.  Kicking along the ground and kicking through the air are 
different kicks and require different bodily adjustments.  As one develops the manner or 
style of the kick, one has to break up the parts of the action in order to perfect and 
perform them appropriately. As one individuates the parts, one can recombine and refine 
them in various ways; a running pass through the air; kicking gently with the toe, a 
running pass on the ground with the toe, etc. 
Each of the hard earned variations in flexibility and recombination lead to further 
fined-grained distinctions and further possibilities for recombination and individuation.  
The entire kick sequence breaks into elements and those elements, in being individuated, 
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are no longer necessarily bound to their immediate action-environment. They break free 
from a particular environment, but they are not directly abstracted away from any and all 
contexts. Rather, first, they show up in multiple contexts.  Sally can use the same leg 
angle to pass far downfield and to score a goal from a distance.  But she might use a 
different part of her foot, or a different amount of force.  In creating these variations, each 
of the parts of the action-sequence become elements ripe for control, reapplication, and 
recombination.  It is in such skill refinement, I claim, that the first agent-controlled 
abstraction from the immediate environment occurs.  This “breaking free” is essential for 
recombination.  It is important to the identification and reidentification of action 
elements, but even more importantly, it is essential for the volitional application and 
reapplication of those individuated elements into various action sequences and situations.  
And, of course, it is also essential for skill learning and skill refinement.   
4. Some further hard-earned benefits 
In this section, I will review two further benefits of skill refinement. It is probable that 
these cognitive products of the intermediate level of RR work in concert with the 
flexibility and recombination that I discussed above in order to propel development into 
the third stage of RR.  For reasons of brevity, however, I will not endeavor to give an 
account of how these characteristics of cognition are related to one-another and how they 
function together in development, generally.   
4.1 Meta-representation 
We should notice that not only do mental states accompany actions, but that paying 
attention to one’s own internal states is an integral aspect of skill learning.23  In the 
                                                
23 As Pezzulo (2011) states, “simulation is not limited to effects of possible actions, [but it] also informs 
one’s idiosyncratic performance and one’s own mental states” (p.99). 
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process of skill learning, one must learn not only about how things in the external world 
should be ordered, but how things internal to oneself should proceed as well.  To learn a 
skill, the idiosyncratic internal features of a task must be taken as markers for the proper 
performance of an activity; one must learn what the right amount of, e.g., force, effort, 
and attention feel like. One has to attend to action elements both as public sequences that 
can be performed by various persons and as proprioceptive sequences that can only be 
accessed from the first-person perspective.  To learn a skill, then, one must attend to and 
control internal as well as external features of a skill.  
As such, we have an elegant way to account for how internal mental states 
become intentional objects.  It is in skill learning that the first crucial inversion of 
attention onto one’s own internal states is born.  It is here that reflection and introspection 
can first be genuinely identified.  After all, because internal states necessarily accompany 
actions, which in the process of skill learning become the objects of effort, attention and 
control, those internal states slip their way into becoming intentional objects.  Clearly, 
there is no sense in thinking of guiding or controlling an action simply by thinking of it 
from a the outside.  We learn to refine skills in the first-person and that requires attention 
to the subjective or qualitative aspects of an activity.  Since attention to many of these 
elements is required for the refinement of skill, it is no wonder that internal states as well 
as external ones end up as the intentional objects of thought and effort. 
As such, our capacity to reflect on our own mental states can be traced back to 
skill learning.  This is because skill learning requires that we take as objects the features 
that are relevant for the improvement of our skills and since the relevant aspects for such 
learning are both internal and external, it only makes sense that we would to attend to 
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both.  There is no great leap here: actions change our perspective on the outside world, 
but they also transform our internal landscapes.  Turning one’s attention to the feeling of 
force required for kicking a ball, is no harder than turning one’s attention to the angle that 
one must hold one’s foot in order to kick the ball, or to the spot on the ball at which one 
should aim.  These different features are equally relevant for skill learning and, as such, 
become equally prominent as objects of attention.  
4.2 Agency 
A further virtue of this particular account of cognitive development is that the 
relationship between a sense of agency and conceptual thought becomes easy to locate 
and explain.  We should notice that agency is not simply a trivial or peripheral feature of 
cognition.  As Andy Clark (2002) describes Dennett’s view, agency and personhood are 
crucial elements of full-fledged, conceptual thought.   
Consciousness, personhood, moral responsibility, free will, and even real 
thinking (see e.g. Dennett (1996) p.130, (in press) p.4) are thus all tied 
together…human thought is thus marked out as deeply different from the 
cognitive capacities of other animals. It is different courtesy largely of the 
culturally incubated mind-tools whose transformative powers open up the space 
within which we actively construct the experiencing and responsible self. 
 
 If Clark (2002) is right about Dennett, and Dennett is right about agency, then 
any account of cognition will only be adequate insofar as it can explain the intimate 
connection between agency and florid, reflective, conceptual thought. 
  On the version of cognitive development that I am forwarding, since full-fledged 
conceptual thought is necessarily preceded by a stage of skill learning, the connection 
between agency and conceptual thought becomes easy to explain. After all, skill learning 
requires pronounced effort, control, attention and a deliberate manipulation of actions, 
which can itself foster a sense of agency as it proceeds.  As Vittorio Gallese and Thomas 
Metzinger (2003) have argued, “in selecting paths to a goal, an organism develops into an 
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agent, the agent actually creates a self in the act of intending” (p.373).  It seems clear that 
in the process of choosing a means and pursuing a goal, a child begins to feel how her 
intentions dictate her actions and thereby change the world. She begins to sense that she 
is not just a passive consumer of information, but a transformer and reorganizer of this 
information. It is thus, through acting, that she becomes an agent.  As such, being an 
agent is not a prerequisite of intentional action, but rather, a characteristic that emerges as 
a result of making deliberate, directed choices.  It is not that one chooses in order to 
become an agent, but in choosing and acting, one simply cannot help but developing a 
sense of oneself as an agent. 
I claim that in being an intentional actor, a manipulator, controller and 
transformer of one’s own actions a subject becomes an agent.  The more a child does, the 
more she feels like a doer.  Therefore, practicing, manipulating, shifting, altering, 
varying, and combining action elements in skill refinement spawns a sense of agency. 
What’s nice is that this feeling is rooted in the body.  One has particular corporal, 
proprioceptive, and kinaesthetic feelings of control that produce very real physical and 
detectable changes as one attempts to manipulate one’s own actions.  The bodily feelings 
of, e.g., force, tension, balance, effort can thus provide the foundation for a robust sense 
not only of ownership, but of a robust sense of agency as well.24 
Crucially, on the account that I am offering, a sense of agency emerges not only 
as a direct result of choosing a goal, but from the continuous, deliberate guidance of 
one’s actions throughout the process of ability instantiation and refinement.25 It follows 
that agency is not the direct result of intentional action alone, but of an intentional action 
                                                
24 See Gallagher (2005) for more on this distinction. 
25 See Frankfurt (1978) for the distinction between intention causing an action and guidance or control 
throughout action. 
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plus the purposeful and deliberate control that one exerts over the instantiation of an 
entire action sequence.  This kind of continuous control explains agency not only in terms 
of mental volition, but extends agency into the world.  Guidance throughout action 
instantiation distributes agency from the moment of choice into the process of action. 
This explains why it is not simply that we feel some flicker of agency as a mental act 
impacts the world, but rather, feel a robust and diachronic agency pervasive throughout 
our actions. 
 We should note that often, when we think of full-fledged, reflective, mental 
representations and higher order reasoning the connection to behavior and thus agency 
appears tenuous or contingent.  After all, much of our thinking is done offline and some 
of it will never have any direct impact on our behavior.  Such a perspective, of course, 
leaves open the question of why agency and conceptual thought are intimately connected.  
It becomes a further question to answer why normal, mature, higher-order cognitive 
function is never present in the absence of a sense of agency.26  This is not the case on the 
account I have presented. Since on my account the development of the conceptual stage 
of representation requires prior experience with skill learning and ability refinement, we 
can see easily why agency is presupposed by full-fledged cognitive capacities.  The type 
of attention and control that is required for skill learning provides us a threshold with a 
high degree of sustained, determined, active contribution to and responsibility over one’s 
actions.  The subject must become an agent if she hopes to learn skills and so she must 
also be an agent in order to be a real thinker.  Agency emerges in the process of skill 
learning and skill learning is a necessary stage in the development of conceptual thought.  
                                                
26 Of course, pathologies of agency are important to consider here (e.g., thought insertion). See Campbell 
(1999) for an interesting account of thought insertion, agency, and embodiment deficits.  
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As such, this intermediate stage of intellectual development assures that a sense of 
agency is present in the later stages of RR.  The connection is that simple. 
5. Concluding thoughts (or two objections) 
Before ending, I should make note of some potentially problematic areas for the above 
theory.  I will not go into detail as to how to address these objections, but I will gesture to 
some potential responses.   
One relevant objection to consider in light of the above claims is whether, in fact, 
skill refinement is necessary for the development of full-fledged conceptual thought.27  
That is, one may wonder whether some children, for example, children with severe 
physical handicaps, who are incapable of the fine-grained physical control required for 
skill refinement but capable of higher-order cognition, may serve as counterexamples to 
my theory.28  The way to deal with these cases, I think, is to look into exactly what kinds 
of skill development these young children engage in.  The prediction that this theory 
makes is that in cases of severe disability, some sort of compensatory strategy will be 
required in order to play the role of skill refinement at the intermediate stage of cognitive 
development.  If this prediction is not born out, it will be a problem for my theory. 
 Another problem that this theory will need to address follows from the fact that 
the behavior of many non-human animals expresses various degrees of flexibility, as well 
as a capacity for identification and reidentification.  As such, if non-human animals are 
incapable of skill-refinement, but are capable of limited kinds of abstraction and 
recombination, then the above account should have something to say about this.29   
                                                
27 Thanks also to Paul Davies for raising this objection. 
28 Thanks to Ruth Millikan for drawing my attention to the case of Alice, a girl with severe cerebral palsy 
who nonetheless developed higher-order cognitive capacities. 
29 Thanks to Marc Borner, Kati Hennig and Michael Tomasello for flagging this as an issue. 
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In response to this objection, I think the most reasonable thing to say is that non-
human animals can develop degrees of flexibility and limited recombinatorial capacities 
at the first-order level of RR.  Further, this kind of first-order flexibility could be rooted 
in a creature’s use of various objects in various environments and in having various 
situation-bound goals that can arise in different contexts.  As such, the kind of 
discrimination and reidentification that comes with encountering and using the same 
object at different times, locations, and for different purposes should be enough to 
underwrite the kind of flexibility evident in non-human animals.  However, this degree of 
flexibility, manipulability, and recombination will not be identical to the flexibility that is 
produced as a result of skill refinement.  
The fact is that it should not be a problem for the above theory that it is possible 
to develop limited kinds of proto-cognitive behaviors without skill refinement.  Such a 
possibility does not undermine the above theory since I do not claim that all and every 
kind of flexibility is explained by skill refinement. If animals develop something 
resembling this feature of conceptual thought via a different means, this is compatible 
with the fact the cognitive products of the intermediate stage of human cognition, because 
they are developed via skill refinement, are characterized by distinct qualities, which 
carry importantly different potentials for further development.  That is, it is wholly 
compatible with the above theory to say that humans develop a kind of flexibility through 
the particular route of skill refinement and this route carries with it a certain kind of 
explanatory power that is missing from the distinct way that non-human animals develop 
their own kind of limited flexibility. 
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